Same, Same but Different: Provoking Relations, Assembling the Comparator by Deville, Joe et al.
99
4
SAME,  SAME BUT DIFFERENT: 
PROVOKING RELATIONS, 
ASSEMBLING THE 
COMPARATOR
Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, Zuzana Hrdlicˇková
I n troduct ion :  What  I s  a  Comparator ?
our experience of working on a comparative project entitled 
‘Organising Disaster: Civil Protection and the Population’, whilst trying to !nd 
the ‘same, same but di"erent’,1 has directed our a#ention to the practicalities 
of undertaking social scienti!c forms of comparison, as well as to some of the 
ethical and political questions that arise from its use.2
Much has been wri#en about the la#er question: as we detail in the book’s 
Introduction and touch on again below, comparison has been critiqued within 
social science from a variety of quarters. $ese concerns range from the unwar-
ranted reduction of complex social and cultural phenomena by researchers 
through the imposition of comparative practice, comparison’s complicity with 
sometimes dubious political and methodological projects (e.g. European coloni-
alism, strident methodological positivism, the creep of market-oriented ranking 
practices), and even the meaninglessness of invoking comparison as a distinct 
practice, given its apparent ubiquity in other se#ings.
What has received far less a#ention are the ways in which comparisons of 
all sorts come into being through an entity that we call the ‘comparator’. We 
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respond to this absence by asking and answering two questions: ‘Who, or rather, 
what, is the comparator? And, how does the comparator a!ect a researcher’s 
relationship with the objects being compared?’
Conventionally, the term ‘comparator’ is understood as a standard against 
which an object is compared. "e comparator (in this sense of the word) is 
therefore a static benchmark – and it is the quality of being both !xed and known 
that allows the act of comparison to take place. However, there is also a type of 
microchip called the comparator that is more active and interventionist – it sits 
in electronic circuits and measures incoming voltages from di!erent sources, 
switching on or o! as a result of its act of doing comparisons between #xed 
and variable voltages (Fig. 4.1).3 "e comparator, in our appropriation of the 
word for social science, is therefore an assemblage that undertakes comparative 
work. As occurs with the comparator chip, social scienti#c comparison has to 
be assembled from diverse entities according to speci#c forms of knowledge 
and expertise. In order to produce the comparative output, these assembled 
parts have to actively intervene and provoke relations between previously 
Fig. 4.1 A comparator chip5
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uncompared inputs.4 For obvious reasons, the comparator in social science is 
vastly more complex and heterogeneous than the comparator chip. As we will 
show, it is not a single thing, but an assemblage of researchers, funders, and 
research technologies – including entities such as databases and so!ware, legal 
regulations and theories, and methods. When it is put to work, the comparator 
creates comparison(s) by shaping and being shaped by the world around it.
"e creative #gure of the comparator is largely absent from literature focused 
on comparison as a speci#cally qualitative social scienti#c practice. In recent 
discussions, its place is taken by much debate about the epistemological prob-
lems associated with comparison. It has therefore been observed that although 
comparisons have fallen out of favour, doing social research is always comparative 
(if only in implicit ways), and should be reconsidered (Gingrich and Fox 2002). 
"e revived interest has led to renewed discussions of a number of old questions: 
Is it legitimate to compare this with that, or what is the tertium comparationis – 
the quality that the things being compared have in common (Steinmetz 2004; 
Wagner 2011)? What are the issues associated with the apparent undertaking 
of comparison and the construction of binary oppositions (Strathern 2011a)? 
What are the speci#c assumptions about relationality that inform Western ideas 
about comparison as contrasted to those from other areas of the world (Ba$aglia 
2011; Candea 2011; de Castro 2011; Strathern 2011a; Strathern 2011b)? How 
might comparison, with its universalist historical baggage, be squared with 
contrasting approaches that have in some quarters been accused of relativism 
(see the various discussions in the special issue on comparative relativism, in 
particular Lloyd 2011; Holbraad 2011; Jensen 2011; Smith 2011)?
Meanwhile, in what is sometimes referred to as ‘comparative urbanism’, a 
number of authors have stressed that comparison would bene#t if it became 
more adventurous and a$entive to relational complexity. "is might be achieved 
by moving away from the orthodox comparison of only large cities or nation-
states, or towards understanding the rich variety of more complex relations and 
relationality informing a given urban se$ing (Cook and Ward 2012; Gough 
2012; Jacobs 2012; McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2011; Ward 
2010). And, in a recent collection that aims to ‘thicken comparison’ (Sche&er and 
Niewöhner 2010), a range of authors discuss the di'culties of doing comparison, 
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while frequently noting comparison’s creative, transformative, and potentially 
pedagogical e!ects. However, by and large, the method shows the analytical 
productivity of making di!erent, unusual, or richer comparisons, rather than 
exploring the situated assembly of the comparative social scienti"c act itself.
Comparison has also been subject to analysis by a number of writers working 
with concepts and methods drawn from Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
#is has shown clearly the way in which comparison is inevitably a construc-
tive, creative act, a dynamic bringing together of entities that are otherwise 
potentially either unrelated, or related in some other way. #is is what Helen 
Verran (2011) and Isabelle Stengers (2011) variously refer to as ‘comparison 
as participant’. However, despite being so good at looking at the methods and 
procedures of others, STS has o$en tended to be rather silent when it comes 
to its own practices and politics (see Haraway 1997). #us, the empirical focus 
has tended to remain on the comparisons done by others, whether by scientists 
(Stengers 2011), medical practitioners (Mol 2002), or indeed non-human enti-
ties as diverse as pigs, neutrinos, and tornadoes (Brown 2011). Again, the "gure 
of the social scienti"c comparator tends to remain invisible and undeclared. #is 
is despite the fact that STS (along with much feminist research) has shown that 
ostensibly detached applications of logic can be deeply implicated in a range 
of unarticulated interests and in%uences. It is thus crucial to study the speci"c 
assembly of the comparative act as it involves the building of what Annemarie 
Mol (2002) calls the ‘platforms of comparison’. Looking at medical practition-
ers, Mol draws a&ention to the speci"c situation that produces the comparison 
(where the comparison is made) and the consequences of pu&ing these entities 
into relation. We are keen to extend this empirical problematisation of com-
parison to social science itself. For if comparisons are indeed omnipresent and 
inevitable (an inevitable ‘ma&er of fact’, as Stengers (2011) puts it), then what 
are the speci"c procedures, (human/non-human) situations, and e!ects that 
produce social scienti"c comparisons?
We aim to show, "rst, that achieving comparison is a complex process in 
which a comparator has to be actively assembled. In our case, this comparator 
is a group of people mediated by a number of research technologies. Second, 
we show that this comparator is shaped by (and shapes) the research object in a 
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continual process. Finally, we explore the potential of an approach that explicitly 
seeks to provoke comparison – in which developments within our research result 
precisely from the speci!c way in which our comparator has been assembled.
We present comparison as we have experienced doing it, seeking it, and 
observing it, mainly within the !rst half of our four-year research project. "is 
is a story of how the creation of a ten-page proposal became a research project 
with a life of its own, shaped by diverse personalities, experiences, knowledges, 
and technologies, as well as our research objects themselves. In doing so, we 
recognise that there is a !ne line between navel-gazing and the constructive 
sharing of one’s own experiences. We hope our paper achieves the la#er.
The  P ro j ect  Comparator
In our project, titled ‘Organising Disaster’, we are interested in exploring the 
ways in which disaster preparedness is produced. We analyse civil protection 
as a speci!c form of ordering society, involving modes of knowledge, technolo-
gies, and organisations intended to deal with disaster. We follow an assembly 
of organisations and organising technologies, and examine how they produce 
particular ways of preparing for disaster, and how this, in turn, has e$ects on the 
way that society is composed. To do so, we look at three national cases: India, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.6 From the very outset, the project has 
been explicitly comparative, with each team member taking responsibility for 
one of the three cases. "e venture might thus appear to be conventionally 
comparative – another in the long line of research undertakings that has the 
nation-state as a unit for comparison. However, we are interested in the question 
of comparison precisely because we are uncomfortable with how it tends to be 
generally problematised. Our response in this paper is an ‘eigen-observation’: 
we scrutinise our own organisational practices and modes in which our own 
knowledge is brought to, and shaped through, the objects we study.
"e following observations give a sketch of the basic layout of one particular 
comparator. However, we maintain that any account of a comparator would need 
to cover a similar set of elements (see below). For this reason, our description 
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can be taken as a !rst step towards understanding its generic features. A work-
ing comparator is always a complex assemblage, and never simply a tool, an 
operation, or a method.
In the !rst part of the paper, we describe the following elements of the 
process: the initial assembling of the comparator and its researcher constituent 
parts, the feeding of the comparator, and !nally the calibrating of the comparator. 
Later, we show what happens when the comparator goes to work.
Assembling the Comparator
We, the comparator, consist of three human team members (Michael, Joe, and 
Zuzana) and a number of technologies. Michael, as the project lead, began 
building the comparator by writing a research proposal. "e number of human 
actors was pre-de!ned by his proposal. Once he received the funding, adverts 
were placed, interviews conducted, and CVs assessed. And it is here that the 
project’s initial process of assembling a comparator begins. "rough this process 
of searching and weighing both imagined qualities and the potential !t into a 
team, there is a move from the !ction of a project as the outcome of a uni!ed 
author towards the project as a contingent practice, dependent on the mesh-
ing and balancing of similarities and di#erences within a team. "is selection 
procedure also highlights a strange imbalance in the comparisons at stake: the 
comparisons that emerge from the research project are founded on the compari-
son of academic CVs and !rst impressions in a carefully staged twenty-minute 
play called the ‘job interview’. "is process decides research routes taken and not 
taken. By bringing together these diverse individuals (Michael, in his decisions, 
and Zuzana and Joe in their accounts of themselves) who in our case were not 
previously known to each other, our comparator was born.
We can now go back to the proposal and read from it some crucial features 
of the particular comparator that were de!ned in it. "e proposal suggests 
undertaking three case studies in three di#erent countries. In other words, it 
sets up a three-way comparison that is in many ways unbalanced. By naming 
countries as the entities to be subject to comparison, the proposal, on the 
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surface at least, resorts to a tried and trusted method of comparing at the level 
of the nation-state. However, already in the proposal it becomes clear that the 
nation-state is a placeholder for a multiplicity of organisations, practices, and 
places. !is becomes even more obvious when we actually work on the project. 
As the project does not merely compare (national) policies, but rather actual 
exercise practices, it lets each case study itself make a variety of selections within 
the mixture of di"ering national disaster management practices. It is a central 
aim of the project to compare countries with very di"erent frameworks: from 
India, with its highly professionalised approach, to Swiss civil protection, which 
is reliant on a dra# system.
!is uneasy form of comparison is not only a ma$er of our research object – 
disaster management – but it is also an outcome of Michael’s particular training 
and exposure to organisational sociology, STS, and European anthropology. 
Combining an ethnography of organisations with an analysis of discourses 
produces the problem of how to relate the local and parochial to a wider set 
of social in%uences. Doing this in three countries in parallel inevitably brings 
up a multiplicity of speci&c empirical levels that do not obviously link up with 
each other.
Further, the proposal makes a crucial connection: it assigns one person to 
each case country. It creates a comparator in which persons are aligned with a 
particular level of comparison (the nation-state). However, one could imagine 
the same project with di"erent persons being responsible for di"erent levels 
of analysis. By pre-deciding to match persons with places, a particular kind of 
comparator was already envisaged in which local specialisation would be con-
ceived of as located in persons, thus following a traditional model – at least in 
anthropology – in which knowledge about places and cultures is assumed to 
be located in researchers’ minds and bodies. However, from the start, decisions 
were made that had signi&cant e"ects on the relationship between researcher 
and place. For Michael, he decided that, despite being Swiss, he would research 
the UK, and not Switzerland. It was his personal way of acquainting himself with 
the country to which he had emigrated. As it happened, the other two project 
members (in typical ‘anthropological’ fashion) would also not conduct research 
in their native countries. While Zuzana (a Czech anthropologist specialising 
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in South Asia) has had experience with conducting research in India, for the 
British economic and STS sociologist Joe, Switzerland was quite unfamiliar. 
!e comparator then is very much one that deals with distributing the sensory 
apparatus of researchers over the world, and brings it back together to exchange 
what was gathered.
Feeding the Comparator: Cohesion and Autonomy
Once the comparator is assembled, its life can assume di"erent forms and the 
comparison it produces hinges on the comparator having a certain cohesion. 
!is is an o#en overlooked feature of comparison. Comparing is a practice of 
bringing material together and pu$ing it in conversation, and not simply an 
assembly of empirical data with di"erent characteristics. Only a comparator – 
able to hold the three in view simultaneously in a practice of commensuration – 
may eventually produce comparison. Before bodies can go into the %eld, they 
%rst have to be made part of the comparator.
Some models for achieving this kind of cohesion include: research and 
writing procedures involving constant struggles over theoretical or disciplinary 
hegemony; a very loose assemblage of individual author-subjects, each with their 
own voice and research practices that exist next to one another; and a hierarchical 
model in which some parts of the comparator are ‘research assistants’ that do 
what the team leader tells them, and in which their primary function is to act 
as extensions of his or her author-subject. Each of these approaches obviously 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. Our approach has been a mixture of 
these. We have a broadly &at structure, but one that is characterised by hierar-
chical ‘moments’ when Michael assumes the role of %nal decision maker. One 
such decision was to specify three parallel research projects associated with 
three di"erent places, which inevitably reduced the autonomy of the other two 
team members. ‘Hierarchy’, then, is not so much a ma$er of an organigram, but 
an outcome of the fact that one person wrote the research proposal, and that, 
in implementing the proposal, Michael also decided to stick (broadly) to his 
original plans.
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Our approach also involves two modes of doing research. !e "rst is an 
autonomous mode, one more familiar to social scientists: this is the pursuit 
of individual research interests in relation to a particular object. Here, insight 
stems from the individual’s personal relationship to that object, in which they 
feel able to bring their own particular set of skills and interests to bear. Based 
on our own experiences, we are con"dent that this mode is a crucial precondi-
tion for an individual researcher’s ability to engage with an object creatively (an 
extreme opposite case would be the over-determined research se#ing where a 
researcher slavishly does the bidding of another). But we also see this autono-
mous, individual mode as one way of feeding the comparator. We will provide 
more examples of this below. For now, it can be summarised as a process of 
pedagogical and creative development: we are continually trying to make this 
heterogeneous, but at least partially uni"ed entity, be#er able to compare than it 
could previously: individual insights about one case have the potential to allow 
the comparator to both learn (i.e. to compare be#er than it could before) and 
grow (i.e. to extend its reach), and to be able to comparatively connect research 
entities that it was not able to connect before. However, in order to be able to 
do so, the comparator has to be trained through a second, less familiar mode 
of engagement: calibration.
Calibrating the Comparator
!e artist John Stezaker splices together portraits of men and women to form 
what he calls ‘marriages’. In a recent interview, Stezaker said:
I am o$en asked why I don’t just get two people, pose them for photo-
graphs and splice the shots more accurately, but that misses the point. It’s 
the imperfect match, the failure of unity, that makes us identify with these 
beings (Phillips 2012).
!e image below (Fig. 4.2) of our team – and Zotero – as comparator is an 
homage to Stezaker’s ‘marriages’. What holds for his images also holds for the 
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comparator: it is the imperfect match created by a!empting unity that creates a 
functioning comparator. Without the a!empt at unity, there is no comparator. 
Further, and more importantly, even if a perfect match were possible, to strive 
a"er it would be to overlook the possibilities for creative tension generated by 
an imperfect uni#cation.
Calibration is one way of deliberately moving towards this imperfect unity. 
It can be understood as an ongoing mutual adjustment – of each, to each other, 
as well as to our technologies, and our research objects. $e #rst route we took 
was to calibrate some of our thinking through weekly reading seminars. $is not 
only helped us read some of the more pertinent literature for our study, but it also 
helped to calibrate our ideas of what we are looking for and how we are think-
ing about what we are doing. Reading is in many ways a comparative practice 
which inevitably shapes how we see our cases, even if the topic is unrelated. It is 
very much the collective act of discussing the reading, in which pre-knowledge, 
or even guesswork about empirical material, is inserted and tested with regard 
to its comparative promise(s). $e reading seminars also highlighted the very 
Fig. 4.2 The assembled comparator
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di!erent ways in which we, the human parts of the comparator, are each in"u-
enced by our training and di!erently conceive of both ethnographic #eldwork 
and issues of comparison.
Another crucially important calibratory practice of ours is how we #le what 
we have read. We process all our materials through another component of our 
comparator – Zotero, a piece of bibliographic so$ware that makes referencing 
much simpler. Zotero is one part of the technological mix that feeds and cali-
brates our comparator (other crucial tools are shared qualitative data analysis 
tools (NVivo), shared online storage facilities, and communication tools that 
enable multi-way, remote communication – e.g. Skype conference calling). But 
more than its bibliographic function, it is Zotero’s ability to become a shared 
database that is particularly powerful for us. All our notes, references, and PDFs 
of journal articles are automatically synchronised, with each team member 
having access to the materials that other team members have uploaded, read, 
excerpted, and annotated.
%is process is a strange kind of pu&ing what is normally ‘private’ and indi-
vidually memorised into the hands of the research group. A researcher’s unique 
trail of readings, similar to their engagement with ethnographic data, is usually 
assumed to be embodied. %e conventionally conceived author-subject is in 
many ways understood as nothing else than a machine (albeit a nontrivial one) 
that rejigs past readings and combines these with ‘ideas’. In its very design and 
promise, bibliographic so$ware, as a recombination and sorting device, already 
implies a re-ordering of the author-subject (Krajewski 2012).7 %e resulting 
databases potentially become electronic #ling cabinets with the (unacknowl-
edged) status of a co-author. As Niklas Luhmann put it in his account of working 
with his own unique sorting system, ‘%e following is a piece of empirical social 
research. It is about me and another: my #ling cabinet’ (1981: 222).
However, using an ever-expanding bibliographic database as a group adds 
a further dimension to this aspect of research practice: texts appear, with li&le 
sense of the logic that accompanied their insertion. At its most practical, this 
means that some of the more mundane work of the comparator can be distrib-
uted across multiple parties: key relevant sections can be excerpted for others 
to use, and key facts and #gures are highlighted. Further, since Zotero does not 
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show (unless manually inserted)8 who authored a note on a text, these notes 
could be wri!en by any team member. Especially if some time has passed since 
the text was noted, this can generate a strange sense of self-misrecognition as 
the reader wonders: ‘Did I write this?’ O"en, it is not possible to be sure, and 
thought processes and ideas start to blur. #is is another step away from a uni$ed 
author-subject and towards a distributed but cohesive comparator.
Moreover, Zotero itself materialises the comparator as a cohesive unity. As a 
uni$ed entity, comparators need to perform processes of di%erentiation in order 
to make comparison possible. In a bibliographic database, any item or note could 
potentially be a unit of comparison with any other. #e result is that, to keep 
comparison stable, the database ends up mirroring and reinforcing the project 
structure. In our own case, this happens in two-ways. First, as we created folders 
for primary and secondary source materials for each of the three countries being 
researched, Zotero reproduced the national case study structure. All references 
relating to India are in a folder titled ‘India’, and so forth. But, second, we also 
created folders for each person, and these were meant to contain any material 
deemed important by him/her. #is dual structure then shows that, through its 
operations, the comparator, understood as dependent for its success on forms 
of communication between team members (and between team members and 
Zotero), produces a multiplicity of possible alignments: people come to be 
aligned with places and certain references, but this happens precisely because 
Zotero is in principle neutral and non-aligned. In practice, it is perfectly pos-
sible for Zuzana or Joe to check material contained in a folder called ‘Michael’.
Further mutual calibration occurs in the writing process, although di%er-
ent types of writing generate di%erent comparative modes. Collective papers 
explicitly provoke comparison, as the writing of this article has revealed to us. 
#is text only partially reveals the numerous (sometimes di&cult) processes 
of calibration we have undertaken as we have tried to adjust to the ambitions, 
ideas, and writing styles of others – with each category having the potential 
to be compared according to values which can be understood very di%erently 
between authors. #is is one of the most explicit sites where negotiation 
emerges as an important calibratory tool. In our struggles for a coherent (but 
not uni$ed) voice, as articulated through texts – as well as in our meetings and 
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conversations – comparison becomes contingent on the success of ongoing 
processes of comparative negotiation.
Autonomous, individual papers can also quickly be pulled towards com-
parison. We decided from an early stage that any member of the team could use 
another’s data as required. We have even wri!en down this sharing principle as 
a kind of contract. "e need for this arose from various issues we discussed at 
the start of the project related to the possibility of people leaving the project. On 
the face of it, this was not related to the comparator; however, it automatically 
contributed to the particular form that the comparator took. "e agreement 
stipulated that in the case of a team member leaving, all of his or her materials 
would remain with the project, but they could also be used by the person who 
was departing. "e remaining team could further use this material for publi-
cations, but that would make the leaving member an author on publications 
substantially based on these materials.
We have also each given conference presentations where one of us has used 
another’s materials for their own comparative purposes. We have frequently 
found comparing our national cases helpful, o#en as an explanatory device. Of 
course, this implies a high degree of leniency on the part of the producers of the 
material. It also reveals to us (as well as sometimes to others) that the comparator 
is something assembled. "e assumption in a conference is that what is said is 
backed by the embodied experience of the speaker. But our creative ‘borrow-
ings’ from others are not ‘citations’: they do not draw on material produced and 
claimed by another author as se!led facts. Instead, our new author – now an 
independent (socio-technically distributed) comparator in its own right – lays 
claim to ‘data’ without being able to fully qualify its use. "is becomes most 
obvious when (during conference presentations) one is required to answer 
questions on the other, less familiar cases.
We aim to reach productive (im)balances through our comparisons, where, 
on the one hand, they hold the potential to make team members think, but, on 
the other, are neither so strange and di$erent as to repel, or simply ba%e. To be 
only able to draw on partially shared understandings of what it means to do what 
we do has the extremely challenging e$ect that, before and while we compare, 
we also compare our modes of working. When working as a team, comparison 
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does not therefore automatically emerge, as it needs to be actively calibrated, 
with materials being constantly reframed through di!erent theoretical and 
methodological lenses.
"ere is one further actor that plays a crucial role in changing the composition 
of the comparator, which we have so far only touched on brie#y: our research 
objects themselves. What then happens when we take the comparator and its 
calibratory apparatus into the $eld and into dialogue with the people and things 
we encounter there?
A comparator is not only calibrated in relation to the persons that compose 
it, but also in relation to the se%ings and objects it a%empts to compare. Much 
has been wri%en about the way that comparison changes the outcomes of both 
qualitative and quantitative research. Less a%ention has been paid to the inverse 
relationship between the research object and comparison itself. In examining 
this, we follow three ways in which the comparator is shi&ed by the entities it 
encounters. "e $rst concerns access – that is, how and when we were able to 
obtain entry to our respective $eld sites. In order to provide a sharp contrast, 
we will focus on just two of our three cases in this instance: Switzerland and 
India. "ese can be said to represent opposing poles in the varying trajectories 
of access we have observed over the course of our project. "e second shi& 
concerns those moments when a particular set of objects in one site shi&s com-
parative a%ention in another. Here we begin to draw all three of our cases into 
dialogue. We continue in this vein to examine the third and $nal set of shi&s. 
"ese are enacted not in relation to a particular set of objects, but in relation to 
practices – comparative practices, in fact. We examine what we can learn from 
the comparisons of others, as well as how we might compare these to our own 
social scienti$c comparisons.
Access Shifts the Comparator
As noted, most discussions of comparison conceive of it as if it were a smooth 
and transparent practice in which the comparator is in full control. "is is 
equally true of those who critique comparison as being oppressive for forcing 
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entities together. !is overstates the power of social research and (particularly 
for ethnographic research) is o"en far from the case: the comparator is depend-
ent on what is usually called access to the #eld. In our project, each researcher 
ideally needs to gain access to at least some parts of each country’s civil protec-
tion organisation. Given the conception of the comparator we have outlined, 
we might rather call it not access, but ‘the extension of the comparator to our 
interlocutors’ (for reasons of practicality we do, however, use the former in 
what follows). !ese extensions are based on innumerable contingencies that 
in turn, shape the comparison. While in non-comparative research these simply 
change the course of the project, for a comparative project each contingency 
has repercussions for the whole comparator. Each #eld note in one site raises a 
potential question about the respective #eld note in the other site(s), and each 
movement of the research trajectory in one site adds tension to the overall direc-
tion of the comparator. To assume that the comparator has the power to force 
ethnographic sites into one comparative framework would ignore the fact that 
each negotiation with a #eld site has its own trajectory that can only partly be 
in$uenced by the needs of the comparator.
Of our three cases, Switzerland provided the quickest and smoothest jour-
ney of a researcher into the #eld. Joe heard a radio interview in which a key 
member of the governmental apparatus that coordinates Swiss civil protection 
was speaking about a major forthcoming exercise. A le%er of introduction 
to the person was dra"ed and Joe received a reply two days later, informing 
him that the request had been forwarded to press relations. A week a"er that, 
another reply arrived from the head of press relations, informing him that 
a"er consultation with the head of the exercise, access had been granted. Two 
months later, he was in the #eld, observing one of the largest command and 
control exercises that had been staged in Switzerland in recent years. !ere, 
he was able to meet key players and develop contacts that would facilitate 
many additional #eldwork visits over the next year and a half, including to 
meetings surrounding a second major exercise. He was also eventually able 
to obtain schedules detailing when and where all the exercises involving cen-
tral government would take place, allowing him to plan and coordinate his 
#eldwork accordingly.
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Gaining access, then, was relatively straightforward. With the bene!t of 
hindsight, we can re"ect on how this part of the comparator bene!#ed from 
at least two broad sets of helpful circumstances. $e !rst are the relationships 
between the background of the researcher, the framing of the project, and 
the history of Swiss civil protection. It was Joe’s distinct impression that his 
position as an outsider helped smooth his access. Within Switzerland, there 
is some sensitivity about the role played by civil protection.9 However, being 
a British researcher and thus ostensibly disconnected from these debates, as 
well as being able to frame the research as part of a wider European inter-
est in civil protection (given the project was funded by the EU), may have 
helped allay fears that the research was being conducted with unstated politi-
cal objectives. $e second is the particular organisational culture that is a 
feature of Swiss civil protection. Chain of command is rigorously respected, 
perhaps even more so than in some other Swiss organisations, given that a 
signi!cant number of its personnel continue to be involved in Switzerland’s 
militia army.10 $ere is also a pervading culture of organisational e%ciency: 
people are almost never late for meetings; meetings themselves closely follow 
pre-planned agendas; emails rarely go unanswered; events are organised in 
good time and o&en months in advance – even years, in the case of large 
exercises; the relevant IT infrastructure allows shared access to key docu-
ments; emergency organisational action plans are rigorously worked over 
and scrutinised; and so on and so forth. For the Swiss !eld site, numerous 
materials existed and were readily available, and access to it was smoothed 
through the very same organisational routines that were part of the research 
object. In other words, the comparator could be fed because the organisation 
itself had certain features that helped to feed it.
Compare this to the labour involved in gaining access to the Indian !eld 
site. $is involved at least four sets of challenges. First, a particular bureau-
cratic actor had to be enrolled: the research visa.11 A major consequence of 
this was to delay the entry of the comparator into the Indian !eld site by 
ten months.
$e second challenge was that the frequent transfer of people between di'er-
ent parts of the Indian administrative apparatus rendered any negotiated access 
115
same, same but different
temporary. In one instance, Zuzana had to liaise with four di!erent heads of the 
same force, all of whom had di!erent opinions about ‘le"ing her in’. Whenever 
one le#, she had to seek new permission from the next. $e %rst two gave an 
oral commitment to support her, while the third ‘head’ even went ahead and 
formally authorised her access. $is, however, turned out to be not enough. 
Upon Zuzana’s return to India for a planned six-month stay (now accompanied 
by a full research visa), the new (fourth) organisational head revoked the access 
granted to her by his predecessor and asked that she obtain authorisation from 
the Home Ministry. $is involved temporarily enrolling the Czech embassy 
(given Zuzana’s nationality), who were required to issue further supporting 
documents until she %nally gained access.
$e third issue was the central position of personal and informal relation-
ships with key people that o#en determined the degree and type of access. 
Many of Zuzana’s initial contacts were brokered by fellow academics either from 
Puducherry or New Delhi. A#er another promising research lead fell apart due 
to a change in personnel, fellow researchers in Puducherry put her in touch with 
someone near the very top of the local hierarchy.12 $is opened a new door to 
a research site perhaps be"er than that which was now inaccessible. Increasing 
familiarity with Zuzana and the project amongst key %gures in the Indian state 
hierarchy also played a role. For instance, towards the end of her stay in India, 
o&cers (who had initially been adamant about strictly following o&cial hierar-
chical processes) became more willing to exert what agency they could within 
their realm of responsibility to make her research possible. For example, she 
was given tips about upcoming events that did not require o&cial permission, 
allowing her to collect perhaps the most important data of her research so far.
$e fourth issue is that disaster management falls under the responsibility of 
the Home Ministry. One consequence of this is that access to disaster response 
bodies is considered a security issue as they are manned by personnel from 
paramilitary forces. To venture into such a highly sensitive %eld site without 
the correct authorisation in India would be unwise, as it could lead to charges 
of espionage and imprisonment.
Compared to Switzerland, the Indian part of the comparator had to become 
connected to a far more heterogeneous and ever-changing set of actors. Zuzana 
116
practising comparison
had to be prepared for the terrain of potential comparison to constantly shi!, 
or for a new actor to be integrated into the processes of calibration and stabi-
lisation necessary for comparisons to occur. Of course, this experience may 
itself in due course be integrated into a comparative analysis of organisational 
di"erences between our respective cases; the question of how we gained access 
is itself part of an ethnography of how these organisations relate to particular 
parts of the public. What will likely be absent from such accounts (because of 
norms of academic self-presentation), however, are the asymmetries involved 
in preparing the ground for such comparative work.
#ere is a further e"ect which relates to the temporal and spatial trajectory of 
comparison. #is concerns the variations in how access is achieved, and when and 
where it happens. Each can shape the overall comparative career of the project: 
access in one site may open up questions in another before any $eld research has 
even been possible. Or, a denial of access in another site may prompt a change 
of strategy in yet another, resulting in a move towards a di"erent type of data 
which, in turn, may re%ect back on the work planned (or being undertaken) in 
one or more of the other sites.
In the Swiss case, early $eld research showed, for instance, that there is a 
signi$cant blur between state institutions and the population when it comes to 
civil protection. #is is because of the sheer number of people that are enrolled 
into its dedicated, militia-based, state-led13 civil protection force.14 A!er an ini-
tial two-week training period, participation in this force can last years, even if it 
only involves a&ending a few days’ worth of refresher courses every year. #is 
opened up an opportunity for comparison and a shi! in the research strategy in 
India: during the period in which access to state institutions was problematic, 
Zuzana shi!ed her a&ention to the localised training of the population, in work 
that is o!en e"ectively subcontracted by the state to NGOs. Here too, then, was 
an instance of the population being enrolled into civil protection procedures.
As access to the NGOs was far less challenging, Zuzana could learn about the 
disaster management arrangements within the local administrative structure and 
observe localised disaster preparedness training practices in several communi-
ties. #e work being done in these communities exhibits numerous parallels 
with forms of training we have observed in Switzerland, and has generated a 
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range of comparative questions: What relations of similarity and/or di!erence 
might the comparator be able to establish between these two forms of disaster 
response training? What constitutes the population in these instances? What 
constitutes the organisation of disaster response? Despite the pre-de"nition 
of the comparison, the comparator’s gaze had thus shi#ed to take in a more 
diverse range of entities. A process of calibration was exposing di!erent forms 
of organisational delegation and negotiations at the interface between civil 
protection organisations and populations.
Only a Comparator Can Produce Absence
In any research project, certain entities may emerge that come to possess a par-
ticular allure. $ese are the entities, for instance, that surprise, that are unusual, 
that ‘force’ our thought (see Stengers (2010)). In our project, one such entity, 
which also shi#ed the comparator’s gaze, has been an object: the shelter – a 
category of building designed to protect its inhabitants from danger. $is object 
produced a move that can only be achieved by a comparator, namely rendering 
visible an absence. Not only did shelters become objects to be researched, but 
also their prominence in one site prompted questions as to the reasons for their 
absence in other sites. It is only by moving through a comparator (either ours or 
someone else’s) that presences in one site can trigger an a%ention to an object 
that does not exist in another. Absence became visible here as data; as something 
that can be positively discussed only because it is relevant somewhere else.
Our interest in shelters initially emerged during documentary research into 
the Swiss case. Switzerland is a country where now, following Cold War govern-
ment policy, there are enough nuclear-proof bomb shelters to house almost 100% 
of the population.15 $is marks Switzerland out as a country whose response to 
the threat of the atomic bomb was, and is, unique in at least o!ering its population 
the possibility of survival a#er a nuclear a%ack (what Elaine Scarry (2011) calls 
the ‘right of exit’). Despite the end of the Cold War, the Swiss shelter system is 
an ongoing project: shelters continue to be built and continue to be maintained 
(even if not to the same degree). As we have explored elsewhere, these shelters 
118
practising comparison
continue to have a direct impact on the conduct of preparedness practice, in 
part because their sheer material awkwardness means that they will not !t 
cleanly into contemporary civil protection paradigms (Deville, Guggenheim, 
and Hrdličková 2014).
We could have le# the object in Switzerland. However, one of the features of 
being in a comparator is that entities in other se$ings tend to o%er themselves 
up for comparison. &is initially occurred in the UK. When we (the ‘we’ here 
being mostly Michael’s end of the comparator) looked for shelters in the UK, 
the entity we found was actually not a material presence, but a material absence. 
At a relatively early stage in the Cold War (partly for reasons of cost and partly 
because of their possession of a nuclear deterrent) the UK decided against 
any comprehensive nuclear shelter building programme. Instead, the British 
population were more or less le# to their own devices, being only provided with 
instructions on how to improvise shelters in their own homes and gardens.16 
For us, this absence was particularly striking given that, in Switzerland, bomb 
shelters were (and continue to be) something of an overwhelming presence 
(Berger Ziauddin 2010; 2012). We also quickly found that this absence had 
played a role in the sometimes contested history of British civil protection. 
&is was, in part, a historical issue – the very lack of shelters for the population 
having arisen as an issue in the anti-war protests of the early 1980s. But it also 
resonated in the present: we argue elsewhere that the very absence of Cold War 
material preparedness practice may have made it easier for the UK to adopt cer-
tain post-Cold War forms of expertise than was the case in Switzerland (Deville 
and Guggenheim, 2015).
A comparison had thus been established and, in the process, the compara-
tor had shi#ed to incorporate the relationship between these organisations 
and their history of building preparedness – as well as what was absent. &is 
points to a more general observation about absences: it is impossible to specify 
absence if one cannot use a comparator to specify the presence of what is absent 
somewhere else in the world (obviously, the ‘somewhere else’ is not necessar-
ily spatial. It could also be temporal, whether historical or utopian, or social 
and cultural). Without a comparator, there are no absences, only presences. 
&e comparator, through producing absence, can then also help to produce 
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new presences: what !lls any absences (the answer can never be simply ‘noth-
ing’)? "is question, in turn, highlighted some of the more general moral and 
political questions that are tied up in all preparedness practice. How should a 
country protect its population? Who is to be included in protective measures, 
and who is excluded?
Our two-way comparator was therefore achieving a measure of stability. But 
again, a comparator can have something of a life of its own and can begin to 
demand questions of us. "e existence of a seemingly neat two-way comparison 
begged the question: what about shelters in India? As we started thinking about 
this, our comparator also began to question both the level of comparison and 
the tertium comparationis (see also Sörensen (2008) on this point). What were 
we comparing when we were comparing shelters? Were we comparing material 
structures designed to defend civilians against disasters, or were we compar-
ing the role and meaning of bunkers as a response to the threat of nuclear war? 
If it were the la#er, then India shows similarities to the UK: nuclear bunkers 
are similarly absent, although some exist for key government o$cials.17 What, 
however, if the comparison at stake is something else, namely the way ideas 
about protection against disasters are materialised?
In the course of looking for shelters in India, Zuzana came across the cyclone 
shelter. "ese shelters are the main purpose-built buildings designed to protect 
the population against cyclones, although people are also encouraged to move 
to other so called ‘life-line’ engineered buildings, seen as strong enough to 
withstand a cyclone, like schools. Fieldwork in Puducherry and Tamil Nadu 
showed that only people who normally live in thatched structures (i.e. they are 
poorer) use cyclone shelters, so hiding in specially designed shelters during a 
cyclone becomes a ma#er of socio-economic status. "e Indian coast is also 
marked with some completely dilapidated shelters that have become the hub 
of what the Indian authorities conceive of as anti-social behaviour and are not 
used by the public in case of disaster. "is failure to protect is ascribed in the 
general discourse of NGOs and the authorities to the lacking sense of commu-
nity ownership. "erefore, the more recently built shelters are actually disaster-
resistant buildings that have other primary functions – for example, serving as 
a local community hall or a school.
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!us, the comparator has shi"ed from the disaster to be protected from (in 
the case of Switzerland), to the relationship between shelters – as a category of 
purpose-built buildings – and the surrounding lives into which they become 
entwined. In the process, its focus intensi#ed on questions such as what the 
politics of entry and exclusion sheltering implies, and the relationship between 
sheltering and the presence of a threat, including the other life of a shelter when 
it is not being used for protection. !e comparator had become interested in 
the way the state administration conceives of its own role, how it understands 
disaster, and how it sees the population and its needs. Some of these interests 
pre-existed the Indian research as under-articulated ideas. However, by fol-
lowing the comparison of an entity that was present in two of the cases to the 
third, the comparator was provided with another powerful lens, both through 
which to consider the relationship between civil protection and the population, 
and to enrich our thinking. As we bounce around our cases, the comparator 
is being fed.
The Field Shifts the Comparator
We – and our devices – are not the only comparator in the research project, 
however. Our comparative project has encountered a world populated by a 
myriad circulating comparators. And these comparators have shi"ed our own.
It is not a simple case – as has o"en been observed – that thinking is always 
comparative, and that this thus also includes ordinary members of society. 
When we refer to the circulation of comparators, we refer to the use, by others, 
of explicitly deployed forms of comparison. !ese are the kinds of comparisons 
undertaken by academics and a range of other interest groups, including part-
activists/part-academics,18 policymakers,19 and our informants.
In India, for instance, Japan is frequently mentioned – an idolised ‘Other’, 
whose disaster preparedness (with its technology, discipline, and civilian aware-
ness of appropriate behaviour in earthquakes) represents practices to aspire 
towards. In Switzerland, Japan is also brought into the comparative frame, 
however, for a precisely opposite set of reasons: the events surrounding the 
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Fukushima nuclear disaster following the earthquake and tsunami (including 
the placement of its reactors in risky locations and the subsequent response 
by disaster response professionals) become a lesson in what not to do. At the 
same time, some respondents have held up the presence of the shelters as a 
legitimation of the Swiss approach to civil preparedness: even if there were a 
nuclear event (the argument goes), the Swiss population would still be able to 
retreat to their shelters.
We are drawn to such ‘!eld comparators’. "ey open up potential important 
questions about the people, organisations, and things we are studying. In the 
above examples, for instance, we are able to see how our respondents invoke 
very particular (and quite con#icting) versions of Japanese disaster manage-
ment. Field comparators, then, very o$en have a transparent political agenda. 
Indian disaster managers would like the population to be as well prepared for 
earthquakes as the Japanese are. With such ambitions, their disaster management 
organisation can continue to grow to reach a wider public. On the other hand, by 
invoking Fukushima, the Swiss want to justify and prolong the existence of their 
bunkers. By pointing at Fukushima, they are suggesting that although the Cold 
War is over, the risk of a nuclear incident, however small, cannot be eliminated. 
"us, people may well at some point need to use the nuclear shelter. So, the 
comparisons of others further fed our comparator by providing fundamentally 
important insights. Our comparator became, then, quite a greedy thing.
Our a%raction to !eld comparators is also based on the very fact that these 
comparators are so di&erent from our own. First, !eld comparators are fast 
because they operate with minimal justi!cations invoking norms of empirical 
proof and theoretical rigour. Ours is cumbersome, as it relies on all the vari-
ous steps we have described in this article in order to make it work and for it 
to conform to ethnographic and academic standards. Field comparators do 
not rely (to anywhere near the same degree) on this sometimes troublesome 
infrastructure. Actors in the !eld can invoke any comparison they like, o$en 
without the need to justify it or to calibrate a comparator !rst. "ey are likely 
neither to have to read extensive amounts of background literature, nor to justify 
what their tertium comparationis is, nor to write a research proposal that justi!es 
why a comparison makes sense.
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Second, our comparator is mainly built as a tool to understand di!erences. 
As a social scienti"c comparator, it a#empts a degree of symmetry by holding 
one example against another, and accounts for various absences and presences, 
varying value judgements and operations grounded in historical routines. It 
simultaneously adds analysis on either side of the entities being compared, and 
tries to keep each case similarly thick.
$e "eld comparators that we have encountered tend to operate in a more 
asymmetrical way, and are chosen strategically to make a political point. $e 
asymmetric comparator proceeds by taking its own case as fully known and 
understood, while the other provides a standard to enable the comparator to 
make a judgement against it – based on a simple set of assessments. Comparison 
here is an evaluation composed of binary values: there is a simple yes or 
no: Japan is good at preparedness; we must strive to become like them; and 
Japanese nuclear power plants break; ours can (or cannot).
One consequence of this is that when we integrate the "eld comparator 
into our own, it becomes ‘re-symmetrised’ and re-politicised in ways that may 
run counter to its use in the "eld. Without our own comparator, our "eld com-
parators’ interventions through comparison would be not much more than the 
invocation of the comparative facts of another situation to make a political point. 
With our comparator, this comparative fact looks rather di!erent: it draws our 
collective a#ention to the political composition of the comparators it absorbs. 
And, in so doing, it highlights particular aspects of the political composition 
of preparedness: what function does the idolisation of another’s preparedness 
practice serve for the idolisers? Does the continued maintenance of Swiss 
shelters really have anything to do with the very particular kind of disaster that 
befell Japan in 2011?
Conclu s ion
As we have seen, comparison is not simply a practice that is imposed onto the 
"eld. Comparison proceeds by "ts and starts, and it is just as much moved by 
the "eld as it moves the "eld. Following our own comparator as it has grown, 
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changed, and shi!ed its focus, all the while absorbing other technologies of 
comparison and the comparisons of others, we have seen it traverse quite dif-
ferent analytical, political, spatial, and temporal domains.
We have also highlighted some peculiar features of comparison: the compara-
tor is highly contingent on its composition, but the very practice of assembling 
it – ranging from job interviews and applications, internal hierarchies, to the 
technologies that keep it stable – is the part of it which is re"ected upon the 
least within conventional comparative practice and never appears in resulting 
research articles. #ese conclusions are brought into sharper focus by the very 
fact that our comparator is made up of a team of researchers. A single-person 
comparator has the luxury of being able to proceed into the $eld far less encum-
bered by processes of calibration, and they can come out of the $eld without 
needing to develop ways to collectively think, analyse, and write. Nevertheless, 
being part of a collective comparator vividly exposes the precise mechanisms 
of comparison.
In this chapter, we have described a comparator that occupies one point on 
the spectrum between highly formalised types of comparative work and non-
comparative ethnographic case studies. Since ours is only an auto-ethnography, 
we cannot compare our social scienti$c comparator to those of others. But as a 
reader, perhaps you now can, as this chapter now takes its home in a collection 
richly populated with other comparators. We ourselves are le! to wonder about 
the comparator we have created and become: has our comparator been assembled 
in the right way? How might a di%erently composed comparator have produced 
di%erent comparisons? How might we have calibrated di%erently? What if the 
contingencies of access had pointed us in di%erent directions? What can our 
comparator see that others cannot?
Asking these questions with the comparator as its focus also allows us 
to conclude by reframing ongoing concerns about the ethics and politics of 
comparison, some of which we drew a&ention to at the start of the chapter 
and which we explore at greater length in the book’s introduction. Much of 
the criticism of the use of comparison in the social sciences has stemmed 
from the observation that by forcing social and cultural phenomena into rela-
tion with one another, their complexity and speci$city ends up being lost. 
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!e argument, in e"ect, is that practising comparison is to practise a form 
of ‘injustice’.
One way to respond to this challenge is to observe that the #eld never 
has comparison done ‘to it’ in any straightforward way. Comparison happens 
through what Isabelle Stengers calls the creation of ‘rapport’ between the 
entities being studied (2011: 49). !is act of creation is neither a given, nor is 
this process ever disinterested. Our comparisons happen because of the way 
people, things, and organisations either smooth out or resist our progress and 
o"er themselves up to the comparative work that we wish to do with them. 
!is is, then, in part about the mundane features of much research practice – 
gaining access for instance – and in part about how entities push themselves 
into contention for comparison. For example, a shelter in one site pushes itself 
into our comparative reckoning, in part because of our desire to #nd a parallel, 
but also because it renders itself as relevant to be taken into account (through 
various formal similarities to other shelters, similarities of material, and so on). 
Enacting social scienti#c comparison is also not a ma$er of the unilateral and 
politically motivated imposition of comparison into the #eld (to which actors 
might object). Particularly in a #eld of research like ours, which is populated 
by experts and individuals in positions of considerable power (a typical case 
of ‘studying up’, in other words), many of the actors we study have more than 
enough authority and mechanisms at their disposal to establish their own, o%en 
highly authoritative, comparisons.
For this reason, another response, one echoed by other contributions to 
this volume (see in particular Gad and Jensen), is to pay more a$ention to 
comparison as it occurs in the #eld. However, we may wish to hesitate before 
delegating authority for comparison to these #eld comparators in its entirety. 
Many of the comparisons undertaken by actors in the #eld are unconcerned 
with the question of whether or not justice is done to comparative entities. !at 
is to say, these are comparisons that are not constrained by the disciplinarily-
speci#c demands of empirical rigour.
To understand the speci#city of (social) scienti#c comparison as compared 
to the comparisons undertaken by many of the other actors in the world, 
we thus need to understand the di"erences in the modes through which the 
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comparator operates. Many !eld comparators are mobile, adaptable, and quick. 
Our comparator, however, is slow and cumbersome. For this reason, it needs 
to do much of its calibration work independently of the !eld. "e problem of 
comparison cannot, therefore, be solved by asking actors (whether organisa-
tion, individual, or non-human) in the !eld to choose the comparative entities 
on our behalf: not only would this elide the work that would have gone into 
choosing that actor in the !rst place, it would simply replicate the problem of 
comparison a level further down the line. One of the bene!ts of allowing social 
scienti!c comparators the authority to set up the comparison is that at least this 
authority is clearly de!ned: there already exist a familiar set of conventions and 
techniques for rendering aspects of the contingencies of comparative practice 
transparent. In this chapter, we have pushed this process of rendering transpar-
ent far further than is usually the case. "e comparisons of the !eld, however, 
do not o#en have such complex comparators.
Comparison is thus never in itself an unjust, colonial, reductive, or violent 
enterprise. It can be; however, in such cases, our energies should be placed 
into demonstrating how, and in what ways, the calibration of the comparator 
was inadequate. We also cannot simply replace inadequate comparators with 
those of the !eld: there may be occasions when we may want to compare in 
collaboration with actors in the !eld (as we in many instances have), but there 
may be other occasions when we do not, or when we judge the comparators of 
the !eld to be an equally inadequate starting point for comparison. Rather, we 
need both to understand our comparators in more depth, and to set them up 
in more productive ways.
In assessing the quality of a comparison, the focus should thus be on the 
operations of the comparator (potentially by comparing it to other compara-
tors) and not on the reactions that the comparison produces. "is is not a call 
for each and every ethnographic comparison to dissect its comparator as we 
have, or to see auto-ethnographic re$exivity as providing a ready-made solution 
for the problem of comparison. It is rather a call for a%ending far more to the 
contingencies of both comparison and the operations of the comparator. "e 
question of the ethics and politics of comparison, then, cannot be answered 
by judging what is compared (or not), but rather how comparators operate. It 
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has to be answered by assessing – whether by selecting the particular cases, by 
assembling, calibrating, and feeding the comparator in the way that we have (i.e. 
with care, with integrity and with a su!cient degree of skill). When assessing 
comparison as a social scienti"c method, we are thus not assessing a unitary 
thing, but rather a diverse and situated set of calibratory steps.
Note s
1 Phrase used in South Asia meaning ‘similar’. 
2 Research for this article has been generously funded by a European Research Council 
(ERC) starting grant (number 263731). 
3 #e comparator chip performs two functions: 1) it measures currents coming into it from 
two di$erent sources, and 2) on the basis of this comparison (and according to prede"ned 
thresholds) it switches either on or o$. See: <h%p://www.brighthubengineering.com/
robotics/60941-the-lm3-voltage-comparator-chip/> [accessed 21 January 2014]
4 It goes without saying in social research that this input-output process should be seen 
as dynamic, and involving a plethora of feedback loops.
5 Photo by Joe Deville. No rights reserved. 
6 Our three cases have been selected because of points of continuity and discontinuity 
in their preparedness practices. For example, both India and Switzerland are, to varying 
degrees, dependent on civil protection mechanisms that are organised from the ‘top down’ 
and are also homogenous, with both having professional civil protection forces on call. 
#e UK, by contrast, has no centralised, professional disaster response organisation, but 
is instead dependent on the coordination of diverse actors, ranging from the police, to 
the army, and to the "re service, whose precise deployment depends on the particular 
disaster at hand. Further, in the original proposal, the three cases were tied together by 
a shared disaster object: &oods. #is was chosen in part because of the fact that this is a 
disaster event relatively common to all three countries.
7 Luhman’s monumental "ling cabinet is a more nuts and bolts example – he famously 
said that, with its help, books e$ectively ‘wrote themselves’ (Luhman 1981). 
8 We decided it was not necessary to insert the author of the excerpt.
9 #is is in part because of its connection to the nationwide proliferation of nuclear 
shelters – as explored in the next section. #is was accompanied by a dedicated civil 
protection force [Zivilschutz] which was composed mainly of men who were unable to 
serve in the conscript militia army (this situation has now changed – see the following 
footnote). In the 1980s in particular, this project became the object of political protest: 
although ostensibly a ‘defensive’ measure, protesters argued that it was ultimately a 
militaristic project that lent unwarranted legitimacy to the Swiss army (see Albrecht et 
al. 1988). A'er the end of the Cold War, many saw the maintenance of the shelter system, 
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the Swiss military, and a dedicated civil protection force as expensive and unnecessary.
10 !e exact proportion of personnel working within the country’s civil protection system 
(this is an umbrella organisation that includes the army, emergency services, Zivilschutz, 
and other organisations) who either continue to be involved in the Swiss army, or who were 
formerly, is unknown. Experience from the "eld, however, indicates that the proportion is 
substantial: perhaps as much as 50%, perhaps higher (given compulsory military service 
is restricted to men, this also indicates how male-dominated the organisation is). 
11 Speci"c administrative regimes apply to foreign researchers, including a lengthy process 
of research visa application and registration.
12 Even here, reciprocal relationships played their part. !is new contact was following 
a PhD programme led by the academic who put Zuzana in touch with him.
13 !is was state-led despite the fact that the responsibility of leading this work was 
largely delegated to the cantons. Because of Switzerland’s federal structure, these are 
clearly appendages of the state. 
14 !is is because of the close relationship between civil protection and the Swiss military. 
!is is an organisation with only a very small number of full-time professional personnel. 
!e remaining manpower is provided by a militia force that (in the event of a con#ict) 
would be called into service. !is militia reserve is initially recruited through a process 
by which young men (usually at the age of 18) are given the option of either entering into 
military service, or undertaking a form of voluntary service, or – and this is what concerns 
us here – entering the dedicated civil protection force (Zivilschutz).
15 At the end of 2010, the Federal O$ce for Civil Protection put the "gure at 95% 
(Bundesamt für Zivilschutz 2010).
16 Some nuclear shelters were built; however, they were only done so for key government 
and military o$cials. See Deville et al. (2014).
17 !e Indian case is more extreme than the UK, for in India there is a lack of even the 
pretence of protection for its population, should it be subject to a nuclear a%ack. !ese 
cases can be used to make a combined argument: just because there is a nuclear threat, 
it does not follow that a country needs to protect its population. Or, seen from another 
angle, it highlights the paranoiac quality of some aspects of Swiss civil protection. On 
a more general level, it leads to an important theoretical insight: risks do not explain 
preparedness, but preparedness has a logic in its own right that uses risks to legitimate 
its actions.
18 In the case of civil defence research, this can be seen in comparative literature, such as 
Lawrence J. Vale’s (1987) !e Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and 
the Soviet Union: !e Evolution of Policies Since 1945, which is both an object of research, 
and academic study for us. Vale – who also did a comparative study – is not simply a 
precursor of ours, but the book is an indicator that, within the "eld of civil defence, a 
comparative view was very much part of the practice of civil defence.
19 For example, a policy paper on civil defence in India compares civil defence structures 
in the UK, Singapore, and Australia (Singh 2006).
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